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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the demand of the Palmers through their attorney, 
Michael D. Blackburn, that the earnest money deposit not be 
returned to the Hayes and the failure of the Palmers at any time 
to offer to refund the earnest money deposit to the Hayes 
constituted an election of the remedy of liquidated damages under 
the earnest money agreement. The standard of appellate review for 
a summary judgment is for correctness.1 
2. Whether the initiation of a suit for actual damages by 
the Palmers after electing the earnest money deposit as their 
exclusive remedy constitutes a "default" under the earnest money 
agreement, thus, entitling the Hayes to the recovery of their 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing their rights under 
the earnest money agreement. The standard of appellate review for 
interpreting a contractual term as a matter of law on a motion for 
summary judgment is for correctness, affording no deference to the 
lE.Q., Walker v. Briaham City. 856 P.2d 347, 348 (Utah 1993). 
6 
conclusions of the trial court below.2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (Attorney's fees—Reciprocal rights 
to recover attorney's fees.) 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow 
at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to December 7, 1992, the Palmers were owners of a single 
family residence located at 2792 South Wood Hollow, Bountiful, 
Utah.3 
The Palmers previously listed their real property with Maple 
Hills Realty. They used Carol Edgmon as their Sellers' agent. Ms. 
2Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P. 2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991); Zions First 
Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 
1988); Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); 
Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P. 2d 1192 (Utah 
App. 1993) ; Fashion Place Inv. , Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/Salt Lake 
County Mental Health. 776 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah App. 1989); Power 
Svs. & Controls. Inc. v. Keith's Elec. Constr. Co.. 765 P.2d 5,9 
(Utah App. 1988). 
3R. at 245. 
7 
Edgmon was an agent working with Maple Hills Realty.4 
Prior to December 7, 1992, the Hayes retained Mr. Tom Baker 
as their Buyers1 agent to locate a home for them in the Davis 
County or Salt Lake County areas. Mr. Baker was also an agent 
working with Maple Hills Realty.5 
On December 7, \W1L , the Hayes entered into a standard earnest 
money agreement for the purchase of the Palmer's home. The Hayes 
paid $2,000.00 to Maple Hills Realty as earnest money under the 
agreement.6 
The earnest money agreement contained the following provision: 
N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the 
event of default by [Hayes], [Palmers] may elect to 
either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages or 
to institute suit to enforce any rights of [Palmers]. 
. . . Both parties agree that should either party default 
in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, 
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement 
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by 
applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing 
suit or otherwise.7 
The purchase of the home was not completed. The Palmers 
contend that the Hayes breached the earnest money agreement. The 
4R. at 246. 
5R. at 41. 
6R. at 7-10. 
7R. at 10. 
8 
Hayes contend that they did not breach the earnest money 
agreement.8 
The Hayes demanded return of the $2,000.00 earnest money that 
they had paid to the Palmers1 Broker, Maple Hills. Maple Hills 
responded by delivering to them a document which purported to 
release Maple Hills from all liability with respect to the ill-
fated sale. Maple Hills required all parties to sign this document 
before the $2,000.00 would be released. Ms. Hayes signed the 
release but Mr. Hayes refused, pointing out to Maple Hills that it 
had no right to dictate any terms of such release. He further 
demanded Maple Hills to release the $2,000.00 or if the Palmers 
were objecting to the release to tell him the expressed objections 
that the Palmers had.9 
Through their attorney, Mr. Michael D. Blackburn of Snow, 
Christensen and Martineau, the Palmers objected to the release of 
the $2,000.00 to the Hayes and instructed Maple Hills to not 
release the money. The pertinent part of Mr. Blackburn's letter 
reads as follows: 
We have been informed that you retain a $2,000.00 earnest 
money deposit in your trust account. We also understand 
that Mr. and Mrs. Hayes have requested a refund of this 
deposit. Demand is hereby made that this money not be 
removed from the trust account for any reason without the 
8R. at 246-251. 
9R. at 46 (reproduced at Tab "A"). 
9 
prior writ 
Palmer.10 
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Court for Davis County, Civil No. 938-289. The Palmers moved to 
dismiss this interpleader action and then sued the Hayes for 
damages i l l I III i" p r e s e n t c a s e noiitfMini II i mi! |i II Hi Il II In Ili< |," "'. i n i | i i M i l t a l b l y 
breached the earnest money agreement. The Palmers have sought over 
$100,000.0( damages.u 
1 
the $2,000 earnest money deposit to the Hayes, nor have the Palmers 
ever given authorization for its release. 
1 ' I c e s I 1 III1 I aw II 1 1 in 
of Kesler & Rust > represent them this action. The Hayes have 
incurred $12,390.2( attorney's fees and $3 •*• costs 
in associril \«> « >-pn^ s'Mit at i, 
level and on appeal, which fees and costs are reasonable and 
necessary through June 30, 1994. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Those facts necessary for the summary judgment are undisputed. 
The Rl ati(lnnii m Il ct I n ,mil I: .1 u : i f. n : 1: 
10R. at: 101 reproduced at Tab "B") . 
uSee generally ' I
 k i nil1 i t I s A H I C I K I C I I I I HII|.> 1 d i m l . . 
effort to tender a refund of the earnest money deposit to the Hayes 
before bringing this suit for damages constitute, as a matter of 
law, an election of the remedy of liquidated damages. The strategy 
that the Palmers are attempting, in asking the court to hold the 
deposit as an offset against possible future damages, has already 
been litigated and clearly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The election of remedies clause in the earnest money agreement 
created a duty on the Palmers not to sue for damages once they had 
elected to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages. Thus, 
the initiation of this suit by the Palmers while still retaining 
the earnest money deposit constitutes a default under the 
agreement. This default entitles the Hayes to their reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred at trial and on appeal in defense of this 
action as a matter of right and law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ELECTION OF REMEDY 
A. The facts necessary to determine the issue of election of 
remedy are undisputed. 
The Palmers emphasize in their brief what they believe to be 
disputed facts that make summary judgment inappropriate in this 
case. Their arguments, however, misconstrue which facts are 
essential to the summary judgment. The essential (and undisputed) 
facts upon which the summary judgment is based are only four: 
11 
I i i s i , i l l i i i l I I  in I III | i in * 11 It ( f e i i ' i a i i r f f nun i i i in in u t i l l in I l l i t 1 i i i , l i n o 
earnest money deposit;12 second, that a letter was sent from the 
Palmers1 attorney, Mr. Blackburi Maple Hills Realty whose 
II in I 1 li I'd 1 iTiei:*!",; liavi never 
made any attempt to tender the $2,000 deposit to the Hayes; and 
fourth, that the Palmers have brought this suit for damages against 
the Hayes. : 
through various pleadings, but these were given by both sides to 
provide a background for the court i11 making its ruling. Only 
those fact.'i I ii.itfsl ml . j" I'll • ir - t. 
B. Utah case law imposes an affirmative burden on the Palmers to 
tender a refund of the earnest money deposit in order to bring 
a suit for damages. 
1 -c cts 
similar those issue here, Dowdina v. Land Funding 
Limited.14 the vendor sued the purchase? ^ * O K
 :_ failed sale, for 
C*I"IIMII dHiikiyef uinlui 11M," ».MIIM"I moi agreemem 'tie agreement 
provided that, "amounts paid herein shall option <>f the 
seller, be retained as liquidated and agreed damages. The seller 
12See, letter of Edward Hayes dated February 8, 1 993 (Tab ffAff) . 
13See, letter of Michael D. Blackburn dated March 8, 1993 (Tab 
"B") . 
14555 P. 2d 957 (Utah 1976). 
15Id. at 95 3 
retained the $200 of earnest money and then brought suit. In 
response to this withholding of money the court said: "[the 
seller] did not, nor did his agent, offer to return the $200, which 
was deposited with the clerk of the court after the suit was filed, 
so [seller's] damages obviously appear to be $200 as agreed.1'16 
There was no equivocation by the Utah Supreme Court. "Under the 
terms of the Earnest Money Agreement if the sale is not 
consummated, the damages are as mentioned above, where the Seller 
opts to retain the amounts paid as was the case here, where no 
offer to return the sum was made."17 The Supreme Court has not 
allowed sellers to retain earnest money deposits and then sue for 
actual damages. Its holding in all of the cases which have 
addressed the issue is as clear as the wording within paragraph "N" 
of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement that is the subject of this 
lawsuit, i.e. "In the event of a default by Buyer, Seller may elect 
to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages or to 
institute suit to enforce any rights of seller."18 "This clause is 
for the benefit of the seller. He will obviously always choose the 
1€Id. (emphasis in original) . 
17-i 
'Id. Accord, Close v. Blumenthal. 354 P.2d 856 (Utah 1960); 
McMullin v. Shimmin, 349 P.2d 720 (Utah 1960); Andreasen v. Hansen, 
335 P.2d 404 (Utah 1959). 
18R. at 10, (emphasis added) . 
13 
i i i | i l in I uni 1 i llhi mi in I ihnMi in n i l ' . i t ) I in in mi 11 I 11 I 111 II it s a d ^ r t n t i i r p mill II I n I I I I \ I i . 
Under those circumstances the clause should be strictly applied 
against the seller and he should be held to meet its requirements 
w i I" In r ' » K a i f i " " j ] i P S S . I , 1 S 
The Palmers cannot sue the Hayes for damages unless they have 
first made some effort return the $2,000 deposit to the Hayes. 
Otherwise*, they mi is t: I the remedy 
of liquidated damages. No attempt tender the $2,000 to the 
Hayes has ever been made by the Palmers. Instead the Palmers have 
against the damages to which they believe they are entitled under 
this suit.20 This exact strategy has already been attempted and 
rejected I: •} t:::l i€ U tal I Si ipi: erne C :: • u : t: :ii i i Close v. Blumenthal ;21 
It is further to be observed that to permit the seller 
to retain the money [liquidated damages] and also to sue 
for specific performance would in effect render the 
option clause meaningless by not requiring him to 
exercise his option. It seems only fair and reasonable 
that where the contract provides that the seller may "at 
his option" retain the earnest money payment as 
liquidated damages, in lieu of enforcing the contract, 
he should be required to make his choice to do one or the 
other, and to act consistently therewith. That he has 
his choice is enough without giving him the advantage of 
both alternatives and thus providing two strings to his 
19Close, at 857. 
2 0See, P l a i n t i f f s 1 Memorandum i n O p p o s i t 
Motion f o r Summary Judgment. (R. a t 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 . ) 
21Supra, , i ic: > t: .< • ] 7 . 
bow. The plaintiff having kept the $500.00 must be 
deemed to have kept it for the purpose indicated in the 
contract, this is, as liquidated damages and is precluded 
from the other remedy.22 
While Close dealt with the Palmers strategy in a suit for 
specific performance, Andreasen v. Hansen23 dealt with this same 
issue in a suit for actual damages. Again, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
[T]he provision he [the seller] now relies upon gave him, 
at best, a choice of two alternatives: either to keep the 
amount paid in as liquidated damage, or to rely upon the 
offer to purchase. The fact that the money was kept is 
incontrovertible evidence that the plaintiffs exercised 
the option to keep it. That being so, they must be 
deemed to have kept it for the purpose indicated in the 
contract, that is, as liquidated damages.24 
The Palmers1 strategy has already been rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court and should be rejected here. 
C. The Blackburn letter constitutes an election of the remedy of 
liquidated damages as a matter of law. 
The Palmers1 brief focuses almost exclusively on the issue of 
whether the Blackburn letter constitutes an election of the remedy 
of liquidated damages as a matter of law. That letter states: 
We have been informed that you retain a $2,000.00 earnest 
money deposit in your trust account. We also understand 
that Mr. and Mrs. Hayes have requested a refund of this 
deposit. Demand is hereby made that this money not be 
Close, at 857. 
'Supra* nt. 17. 
^Andreasen. at 408 (emphasis added). 
15 
removed from the trust account for any reason without the 
prior written permission of Kenneth F. and Rebecca A. 
Palmer 25 
The Palmers argue that the trial court failed to give them the 
b e n e ! it fill ( iiii " reason,, ill 11 * in m ,!•." Midi juhl h e d e r i v e d f N > M 
this letter which would make something other than what it 
appears to be on its face, i.e. , a demand that the earnest money 
deposi t not he rnLeased I i m 1 he 1 Ia> es 
The first inference the Palmers would like this Court to draw 
from the Blackburn letter "is that * *^  Palmers did not elect > 
[sic] it: emed^ :: >f sar i: :ie i 
written form as presented."21 The letter, however, does not address 
any concerns that the Palmers may have had about the form c f the 
release, i IC r dc € s :i t e i ei i i = .f = r t: :: t::l: i = i: a] ease pi esei i t e e l lb1"1) : ». 
Hills. Wha t t:l le ] etter does address :i s control of the $2,000 
deposit. At the very least the letter m\ ist be read as an assertion 
c I o i ei: I:::l I = m o i ic= ;j b] till: i B Pa] inei: s, The argument by the 
Palmers that, "Demand is hereby made that this money not be removed 
from the trust account for any reason without the prior written 
permission Il | I llh III1.) 1 i n e i : s ] ' " m e a n s ,suiiu.«l li i in) I liei I hiin i 
release the money to the Hayes" is inane, Further, the attempi 
Letter of Michael D. Blackburn, attorney for the Palmers, to 
Maple Hills Realty dated March 8, 1993 (reproduced at Tab " B " ) . 
26Br (emphasis deleted) . 
]| 6 
construe the statements of the trial court as an admission that 
the Blackburn letter was "obviously" a response to the form of the 
release is a transparent misconstruction of a quote out of 
context.27 
The second inference the Palmers suggest "is that the letter 
is not an unequivocal election of the remedy of earnest money but 
is, rather, a preservation of the status quo until such time as the 
Palmers had the opportunity to decide what remedy to elect."28 
While it is true that the earnest money agreement imposes no time 
limit upon the Palmers for electing their remedy, this does not 
mean that the Palmers were free to institute a suit for damages 
against the Hayes while still retaining control over the earnest 
money deposit and refusing to release it to the Hayes. The Hayes 
had made demand for the return of the $2,000 when the sale of the 
home collapsed.29 The Hayes were entitled to the return of their 
deposit upon demand unless the Palmers elected to retain the $2,000 
as their liquidated damages. Even if the intention of the 
Blackburn letter was to simply maintain the status quo, the Palmers 
27See, Brief of Appellants at 18-19. 
28Brief of Appellants at 19 (emphasis deleted). 
29See, letter of Edward Hayes to Maple Hills Realty dated 
February 8, 1993 (reproduced at Tab "A"); see also, letter of 
Michael D. Blackburn to Maple Hills Realty dated March 8, 1993 
(reproduced at Tab "B"). 
17 
must be deemed to have elected the remedy of liquidated damages 
because they refused to release control of the money when it was 
demanded and continued to retain control over the money even after 
bringing suit for damages. In effect the Palmers are trying to 
say, "You can't have your money back, but that doesn't mean that 
I'm keeping it either." The fact remains that the Palmers did 
retain control over the earnest money deposit and they should not 
now be allowed to have it both ways. 
The third inference that the Palmers claim the trial court 
failed to give them is really an argument that the trial court made 
three errors in interpreting the Blackburn letter and the 
relationship between the Palmers, the Hayes, and the broker, Maple 
Hills. These alleged errors are that: 
(1) the trial court repeatedly misread the Blackburn 
letter as an instruction to not release the money, 
despite the fact that no such language appears anywhere 
in the Blackburn letter; (2) the trial court repeatedly 
refused to consider that the real estate broker was also 
the agent of [the Hayes]; and (3) that the trial court 
imposed on the Palmers the duty of instructing the agent 
of [the Hayes] how to redraft its form for return of 
[sic] earnest money.30 
Each one of these allegations is groundless. Of the first 
allegation all that needs to be said is that to claim that there 
is no language instructing Maple Hills not to release the earnest 
money in the Blackburn letter is absurd. That is exactly what it 
30Brief of Appellants at 20 (emphasis deleted). 
18 
says. 
The second and third allegations both involve the dual 
representation of Maple Hills as both buyer's and seller's agent. 
The trial court did consider the nature of this relationship and 
pointed out that for purposes of the election of remedies it did 
not make a difference.31 The earnest money deposit was paid over 
by the Hayes to Maple Hills as the agent of the Palmers. It is the 
seller's agent and not the buyer's that holds the earnest money 
deposit. Thus, Maple Hills held the $2,000 as representative of 
the Palmers, not the Hayes. It was the Palmers who had control 
over the deposit and were entitled to instruct their agent as to 
its handling. The only instruction that the Palmers ever gave to 
their agent was to not release the money.32 
The question of Maple Hills' improprieties is an entirely 
separate issue. If the Palmers had instructed Maple Hills to 
refund the money to the Hayes and Maple Hills had refused or 
insisted on some inappropriate form of release then the Palmers 
could have sued Maple Hills for breach of their fiduciary duty, but 
the Palmers never made any effort to refund the deposit to the 
Hayes, instead the Palmers instructed their agent not to release 
the money. The Utah case law is clear on this point—the Palmers 
31See, R. at 368. 
32See, Blackburn letter (reproduced at Tab "B") . 
19 
have elected their remedy by retaining the earnest money deposit 
without making any effort to tender it to the Hayes.33 
The fourth "reasonable inference" that the Palmers claim the 
trial court failed to make "is that Blackburn's letter is nothing 
more than a reminder to the real estate broker of the broker's 
obligation under State of Utah regulations governing trust 
accounts."34 This contention strains the meaning of "reasonable 
inference". There is no reference in the letter to state 
regulations or even to the proper handling of trust accounts. The 
letter cannot be viewed as anything other than what it is—an 
instruction not to release the deposit to the Hayes. 
II. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
A. General framework for the recovery of attorney's fees in court 
actions. 
Utah follows the traditional American rule that attorney's 
fees are recoverable if provided for by statute or contract, and 
that when the attorney's fees are provided for by contract, they 
are only recoverable according to the terms of that contract.35 The 
33See. Dowdina v. Land Funding Ltd.. 555 P.2d 957 (Utah 1976); 
Close v. Blumenthal, 354 P.2d 856 (Utah 1960); McMullin v. Shimmin. 
349 P.2d 720 (Utah 1960); Andreasen v. Hansen. 335 P.2d 404 (Utah 
1959) . 
34Brief of Appellants at 22. 
35Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); 
Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984); Turtle 
Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 
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agreement between the Palmers and Hayes was governed by an earnest 
money agreement that states in pertinent part: 
M. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the 
event of default by [Hayes], [Palmers] may elect to 
either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages or 
to institute suit to enforce any rights of [Palmers]. 
. . . Both parties agree that should either party default 
in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, 
the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement 
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by 
applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing 
suit or otherwise.36 
Thus, attorney's fees were provided for by contract in the case of 
default by either party. 
In ruling on the issue of attorney's fees on the motion for 
summary judgment the trial court held that the earnest money 
agreement did provide for the award of attorney's fees in case of 
default by either party, but denied the Defendants' request for 
attorney's fees, holding that the Palmers had not defaulted under 
the terms of the earnest money agreement. The court reasoned that 
electing the $2,000 as liquidated damages and then pursuing a legal 
remedy for actual damages did not constitute a default: 
[The Palmers] have elected to attempt to pursue a remedy 
to which they are not entitled, but they have not 
"defaulted" under the Earnest Money Agreement. There 
(Utah 1982); Estate of Schmidt v. Downsr 775 P.2d 427 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
36R. at 10. 
21 
apparently being no other basis upon which the [Hayes] 
seek attorney's fees, and the Court having determined 
that the contract does not allow attorney's fees except 
in circumstances of "default", the [Hayes] request for 
attorney's fees must be refused.37 
The Hayes maintain that the actions of the Palmers did amount 
to a default as a matter of law, and thus, the Hayes were wrongly 
denied their attorney's fees in this action. 
B. The actions of the Palmers constitute a default as a matter 
of law. 
Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed. defines default as "the 
omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual duty."38 The 
Supreme Court of Vermont, in a case with similar facts to the 
present case, has defined default as being synonymous with breach 
of contract when interpreting a limitation-of-remedies clause.39 
There is also authority for the proposition that there can still 
be a default even where there is no wrongful act.40 The earnest 
money agreement between the Palmers and Hayes created a duty upon 
the Palmers to not seek further damages once they had elected to 
retain the $2,000 deposit as liquidated damages. For the Palmers 
37R. at 303-304. 
38Crting, Easterwood v. Willinqham, 47 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1932) ; see also. Singer Co. v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. . 
558 A.2d 419, 428 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). 
39Simpson Dev. Corp. v. Herrmann. 583 A.2d 90, 92 (Vt. 1990). 
40Sadler Mach. Co. v. Ohio Natfl, Inc.. 202 F.2d 887, 893 (6th 
Cir. 1953). 
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to bring the present action seeking recovery of damages while 
retaining the liquidated damages is a breach of the contractual 
terms set forth in the earnest money agreement, and thus 
constitutes a default as a matter of law. 
Utah law also provides support for this conclusion. In 
Hackford v. Snow/1 the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the issue of 
awarding attorney's fees under an earnest money agreement very 
similar to the one at issue here. The applicable provision of the 
agreement in Hackford read, "If either party fails to [perform], 
he agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing this agreement or any 
right arising out of the breach thereof, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee."42 While the provision in Hackford and that at 
issue in the present case differ slightly in their wording their 
intent is clearly the same. It is the failure to perform in one 
and the default in the other that entitles the other party to 
recover their attorney's fees. 
The trial court in Hackford found that the party from whom the 
attorney's fees were sought "had failed to comply with the terms 
and the conditions of the [earnest money] agreement."43 Thus, it 
was error for the trial court not to award attorney's fees as 
41657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982). 
42Id. at 1277. 
43Id. 
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provided for in the contract. 
The Hayes find themselves in an identical situation to the 
Hackford case. The trial court found that the Palmers' retention 
of the earnest money deposit precluded the present action for 
damages.45 Thus, the Palmers1 suit for damages is a violation of 
the terms and conditions of the agreement, or in other words, a 
default46 under the agreement. Despite this finding, the trial 
court has denied the Hayes the attorney's fees to which they are 
entitled as a matter of law under the terms of the earnest money 
agreement. 
C. The Hayes are entitled to the recovery of their reasonable 
attorney's fees as a matter of right and law. 
When a contract provides for the recovery of attorney's fees 
in the case of default and a default has occurred, the non-
defaulting party is entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred in enforcing their rights under the agreement as a matter 
of right and law.47 This is not an equitable standard and it is not 
up to the trial court's discretion to choose to award attorney's 
45R. at 303. 
46See, definitions of "default" supra. 
47Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985); Hackford 
v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Utah 1982); Saunders v. Sharp, 793 
P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990), on remand, 840 P.2d 796, 809 (Utah 
App. 1992); Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App. 1989). 
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fees once a default has been found. Even where a party seeks to 
avoid the contract, as is the case with the Hayes, he is still 
entitled to the recovery of his reasonable attorney's fees for 
enforcing the benefits of the agreement.48 
The purpose of the attorney's fee clause in the earnest money 
agreement is to protect someone in exactly the Hayes position. The 
Palmers have sought to circumvent the terms of the agreement by 
retaining the earnest money deposit and instituting a suit for 
damages. The only way that the Hayes could enforce their 
contractual rights was to incur attorney's fees in their defense 
to the present action. These fees were necessitated not at the 
instance of the Hayes but by the efforts of the Palmers to both 
have their cake and eat it too. The agreement specifically 
contemplates the recovery of attorney's fees by the Hayes in such 
a situation.49 
The trial court found that the Palmers had acted contrary to 
the terms and conditions of the earnest money agreement,50 but 
nevertheless, declined the Hayes their attorney's fees. The trial 
court simply declined to label the Palmers' breach of the earnest 
46Cleqq v. Lee. 516 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973). 
49See supra, paragraph "N" of the earnest money agreement. 
50See. R. at 301-303. 
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money agreement a "default".51 The Hayes seek to have this Court 
rectify this verbal misconstruction and award them their reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in defending against this unjustified 
suit.52 
D. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 also provides for the recovery of 
the Hayes" attorney's fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 provides that: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow 
at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
Because of the fairly recent adoption of this statute it has not 
yet been interpreted by either this Court or the Utah Supreme 
Court. All of the cases which cite the statute have found it 
inapplicable because they were dealing with contracts executed 
before April 28, 1986.53 The intent of the statute, however, is 
clear from its wording. The statute contemplates a situation where 
one party will be entitled to recover their attorney's fees based 
51See, R. at 303-304. 
""Provisions in written contracts providing for the payment 
of attorney fees should ordinarily be honored by the courts." 
Cobabe v. Crawford. 780 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah App. 1989); accord, 
Soffe v. Ridd. 659 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Utah 1983); Stacev Properties 
v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah App. 1988). 
53Saunders v. Sharp. 840 P.2d 796, 809 nt.6 (Utah App. 1992); 
Carr v. Enoch Smith Co. , 781 P.2d 1292, 1296 nt.5 (Utah App. 1989); 
Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 nt.2 (Utah App. 1989). 
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upon a provision of a written contract if they prevail on the 
merits of their claim. In such a case the legislature wished to 
confer equitable discretion upon the courts to award attorney's 
fees to the other side if they should prevail in the lawsuit even 
if the contract only provided for attorney's fees to one side. 
The Palmers would clearly have been entitled to recover their 
attorney's fees had they prevailed in the court below. Their suit 
was to recover damages based upon the alleged default of the Hayes. 
Had this alleged default been proven the attorney's fee clause54 
would have been triggered in favor of the Palmers. If the trial 
court's conclusion that the actions of the Palmers did not 
constitute a default of the earnest money agreement is upheld then 
the Hayes will not be able to recover their attorney's fees based 
on the contract despite prevailing on the merits of the case. This 
is precisely the type of inequity that § 78-27-56.5 was designed 
to rectify. Even if the actions of the Palmers are found not to 
be within the definition of "default" as that term is used in the 
earnest money agreement, this Court should nevertheless award the 
Hayes their attorney's fees incurred in this action based on the 
discretion conferred upon the Court by § 78-27-56.5. 
Paragraph "N" of the earnest money agreement, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Palmers failure to tender a refund of the earnest money 
prior to bringing suit for damages and their instruction to their 
broker not to release the money constitute, as a matter of law, an 
election of the remedy of liquidated damages. Thus, any suit for 
actual damages is precluded. The Palmers have defaulted under the 
earnest money agreement by bringing suit for actual damages, 
entitling the Hayes to recovery of their reasonable attorney's fees 
in defending against this action. 
The Hayes respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
summary judgment below as to the issue of election of remedies and 
reverse as to the issue of attorney's fees and remand with 
instructions that the trial court issue an order awarding the Hayes 
their reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this action both at 
the trial court level and on appeal. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1994. 
KESLER & RUST 
•7 .S1 
Lester A. Perry / 
Attorney for Defendants/" 
Appellees 
h:\kmw\hayes\br1ef 
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ADDENDUM 
Letter of Edward T. Hayes to Maple Hills Realty dated February 
8, 1993. (Record at 107.) 
Letter of Michael D. Blackburn to Maple Hills Realty dated 
March 8, 1993. (Record at 108.) 
Memorandum Decision of April 1, 1994. (Record at 296-305.) 
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February 8, 1993 
Maple Hille Realty 
460 8outh 100 Sast 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Dear Mr. Marehall{ 
After reviewing th 
regarding the diap 
you that I will be 
the lav ia that th 
money would be the 
plaaaa adviee ne. 
right to make oond 
returned. I augge 
money immediately 
requeeted that it 
e document that wee brought to our office 
oaition of cur deposit, I regret to inform 
unable to algn it. My underetanding of 
e only peraon who could havo claim on the 
Palmare. If they have auch a alalin, 
You, on the other hand, heva no legal 
itione under which the deposit would be 
at atrongly that you either forward the 
or let me know that the Palaera have 
not be returned for soma reason. 
Edward T. Kayee 
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March 8 , 1993 
OrcOUNSCL 
H A # O U > a CM«NSTCNSCN 
M O I U N A. LTSSOTT 
SAYAN A. OCUWTS 
wwrrcirs ornccr NOMSCA: 
(801) 322-9123 
Ron Marshall 
Maple Hills Realty 
460 South 100 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Dear Mr. Marshall: 
It is unfortunate that the potential sale to Ed and 
Stephanie Hayes could not be concluded. 
We have been informed that you retain a $2,000.00 earnest 
money deposit in your trust account. We also understand that Mr. 
and Mrs. Hayes have requested a refund of this deposit. Demand 
is hereby made that this money not be removed from the trust 
account for any reason without the prior written permission of 
Kenneth F. and Rebecca A. Palmer. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Michael D. Blackburn 
MDB:skm 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH F. PALMER, JR., and 
REBECCA A. PALMER, husband 
and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EDWARD HAYES and STEPHANIE 
HAYES, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
: 
CASE NO. 930905590 
Before the Court is the defendants Hayes' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The parties appeared through counsel on March 28, 1994, 
and argued their respective positions. Following oral argument, 
the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the 
written submissions of the parties and to consider in more detail 
the decisions of the appellate courts of this state relating to 
election of remedies. Since having taken the Motion under 
advisement, the Court has had an opportunity to once again review 
the legal Memoranda of the parties and to review closely the 
decisions of the appellate courts relating to election of remedies, 
and being otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
This is a case where the plaintiffs (sellers) sued the 
defendants (buyers) for damages resulting as a result of the 
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defendants' alleged breach of contract in connection with the 
purchase of the plaintiffs' home* The defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment asserts that this action must be dismissed against 
the defendants on the basis that pursuant to the contract sued upon 
by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have elected a remedy of 
retaining the earnest money payment of the defendants to the 
plaintiffs, and under the terms of the contract are therefore 
prohibited from suing the defendants for damages. 
While there are a number of disputed issues in this case, it 
is not disputed that the parties had between them a customary 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement that included in paragraph "N" 
therein, the following: 
In the event of default by buyer, seller may elect 
to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages, 
or to institute suit to enforce any rights of seller. 
While the defendants deny that they breached the Earnest Money 
Agreement by failing to complete the transaction in this matter, 
they argue for purposes of this Motion that even if they did 
default as plaintiff alleges, the plaintiffs have elected their 
remedy of retaining the $2,000 earnest money originally deposited 
by the defendants with the plaintiffs' real estate agent. (Much 
has been made by the plaintiffs in oral argument that the 
plaintiffs and defendants utilized the same real estate brokerage-
PALMER V. HAYES PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
each had different agents within that brokerage, but the Court is 
satisfied that such a circumstance does not alter the result in 
this case.) The defendants further argue that the plaintiffs' 
election to retain the $2,000 earnest money as liquidated damages 
prohibits the plaintiffs from filing this suit, which was done on 
September 28, 1993 on the theory that the plaintiffs have elected 
a remedy against the defendants other than a suit for damages in 
accordance with the aforementioned contractual provision. 
Assuming for the sake of this Motion only that the defendants 
defaulted under their obligations contained in the aforementioned 
Earnest Money Agreement, the plaintiffs had two options under the 
contract. Either the plaintiffs could elect to retain the $2,000 
earnest money as liquidated damages, or they could file a lawsuit 
seeking damages. It is clear under principles of law relating to 
election of remedies and under the contract provisions that the 
plaintiffs may not do both. 
As indicated originally, and it is apparently without dispute, 
the earnest money deposited by the defendants was being held by the 
real estate brokerage firm, Maple Hills. Following the refusal of 
the defendants to continue with the property sale transaction, the 
defendants demanded from the real estate brokerage, the return of 
their earnest money. In response thereto, the real estate 
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brokerage prepared a Release of Earnest Money Deposit, which 
purported to release the real estate brokerage from any claims that 
either the plaintiffs or the defendants may have had against it as 
a result of the manner in which the real estate brokerage and its 
agents in representing both the plaintiff and the defendant may 
have conducted themselves. 
The documentation before the Court in connection with this 
Motion shows that one of the defendants Hayes refused to sign the 
Release, which included a release of claims that it may have 
against the Maple Hills real estate brokerage. Under cover of a 
letter, dated February 8, 1993, to Maple Hills Realty, the 
defendant Mr. Hayes advised Maple Hills Realty that the attempt of 
Maple Hills to insert conditions for the return of the deposit 
protecting Maple Hills was inappropriate, and requested that the 
deposit be returned as previously requested, or that the defendants 
be advised of the plaintiffs' (the sellers) claims against the 
earnest money. Maple Hills did not return the funds prior to March 
8, 1993 when it received correspondence from attorney Michael D. 
Blackburn, representing the sellers, that the realty company was 
not to return the earnest money to the Hayes who had made a request 
for a refund, and finally that the funds not be disbursed in any 
fashion without the prior written permission of the sellers. 
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Thereafter, Maple Hills real estate brokerage deposited the 
money into the Circuit Court in Davis County and through 
stipulation the monies were transferred to the Third District 
Court. 
Plaintiffs argue that they did not retain the $2,000, but 
rather it was retained by the real estate agent and brokerage firm, 
Maple Hills. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
reasons for Maple Hills' refusal to return the funds were anything 
other than the instructions from the plaintiffs that it was not to 
release the funds. Plaintiffs' counsel argues that Maple Hills 
would not have released the funds, even if the Palmers had directed 
them to do so, without the Palmers and the Hayes executing the 
release in favor of Maple Hills. Unfortunately, the Court has not 
been directed to any portion of the record that would so suggest, 
and Mr. Blackburn's letter on behalf of the Palmers to Maple Hills 
does not suggest that the reason they are instructing Maple Hills 
to retain the sums rather than to return them to the Hayes is 
because of Maple Hills' insistence on a release. Mr. Blackburn's 
letter on that subject to Maple Hills is silent. 
The cases which deal with this issue from the Utah Supreme 
Court include cases where the earnest money deposit was being held 
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by a real estate agent. The fact that the funds were being held by 
the real estate agent for the plaintiffs does not in the Supreme 
Court decisions mean that the plaintiffs did not retain control. 
It would appear from a review of the reading of the Supreme 
Court decisions that a failure to tender the earnest money back to 
a defaulting purchaser constitutes an election to retain the 
earnest money as liquidated damages in lieu of suing for what 
damages might be proven. The wording of the Supreme Court 
decisions seems to suggest that there is an affirmative obligation 
to tender the sums back on the part of persons such as the 
plaintiffs who are required to make an election of their remedy. 
There is no evidence that the plaintiffs ever tendered the $2,000 
to the Hayes so as to show a non-election of liquidated damages 
provision of the Earnest Money Agreement, but to the contrary, 
affirmative actions on the part of the plaintiffs directed their 
agent, Maple Hills, not to disburse the funds. If such conduct 
does not constitute a constructive, informed decision to elect the 
remedy of retention of the earnest money as liquidated damages, 
then certainly it leads the Court to a conclusion that a 
constructive retention of liquidated damages occurred, thus binding 
the plaintiffs to the decision to elect the remedy of retention of 
the earnest money. 
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The fact that the defendants have not made repeated requests 
for return of the earnest money is not fatal to the defendants' 
position. This Court is unable to find anything in the reported 
decisions that would suggest that repeated requests for return of 
the funds is necessary. In fact, the decisions do not necessarily 
require that there even be a demand on the part of allegedly 
defaulting parties for return of earnest money, but rather the 
obligation appears to be upon the non-breaching party to make 
tender of the earnest money so as to attempt to refund the same, to 
avoid the election of that remedy. 
In the final analysis, the plaintiffs by instructing their 
agent, Maple Hills, to retain the earnest money paid by the 
defendants, elected the remedy of retaining the earnest money as 
liquidated damages and therefore forfeited the alternative election 
of suing the defendants in damages. Plaintiffs' argument that they 
never would have made such an election, because of the large 
damages they claim to have suffered as a result of the defendants' 
alleged breach, is not persuasive. Whether or not the plaintiffs 
consciously determined to select the remedy of retaining the 
earnest money as liquidated damages is unimportant when their 
conduct is such that they have retained the funds and have 
therefore, advisedly or not, elected that remedy. 
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Based upon the foregoing and those other arguments suggested 
by the defendants in their moving papers, and as suggested at oral 
argument, the Court is compelled to grant the defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment as to the plaintiffs on the basis that the 
plaintiffs have elected the remedy of retention of the earnest 
money as liquidated damages, and have therefore foregone their 
right to file this suit as to these defendants. The Court has been 
advised that there is a request to amend the pleadings to join 
Maple Hills real estate brokerage firm as a party defendant, and 
this Summary Judgment will, of course, not affect that request. 
The defendants further seek attorney's fees in this matter on 
the basis of the aforementioned paragraph "N" of the Earnest Money 
Agreement. The aforementioned paragraph allows attorney's fees 
against a defaulting party under the terms of the Earnest Money 
Agreement. While the defendants have prevailed in convincing the 
Court that this lawsuit against them should be dismissed on the 
basis that the plaintiffs have elected a remedy of retention of the 
earnest money, that decision does not lead this Court to the 
conclusion that the plaintiffs have defaulted under the terms of 
the Agreement. They have elected to attempt to pursue a remedy to 
which they are not entitled, but they have not "defaulted" under 
the Earnest Money Agreement. There apparently being no other basis 
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upon which the defendants seek attorney's fees, and the Court 
having determined that the contract does not allow attorney's fees, 
except in circumstances of "default", the defendants' request for 
attorney's fees must be refused. 
Counsel for the defendants is instructed to prepare an 
appropriate Order granting Summary Judgment for the reasons set 
forth in this Memorandum Decision, and that Order and Judgment is 
to include this Court's decision as it relates to the question of 
attorney's fees. The form of Order is then to be submitted to 
counsel for the plaintiffs, who is to review the same for form and 
if proper in form, submit the same to the Court for review and 
signature, all in accordance with the Code of Judicial 
Administration. . /~\ .A 
Dated this^ T dav of Wtafi?c&} 1994. 
TlMOtfHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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